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Aft r four decades  as prime examples  of inward-  * Rapid,  far-reaching  reform  is possible  in
looking  trade  policies and import-substituting  sectors  that were subject  to prolonged  periods  of
industrialization,  several  Latin American  coun-  heavy  protection.
tries  undertook  comprehensive  trade liberaliza-
tion and macroeconomic  adjustment  in the  * Sustained  growth  requires  a comprehensive
1980s.  De Melo and Dhar contend  that the  reform  package,  with supporting  policies  for
experiences  in those countries  are relevant  for  labor, capital,  and domestic  product  markets.
the economies  in Eastem Europe  and the former
Soviet Union  in transition  from socialism  to  * Liberalization  of the financial  sector  re-
market economies.  quires investigating  the links between  commer-
cial banks and private sector  firms.
In all of these  Latin American  countries,  the
move  toward an outward  orientation  occurred  * If trade  liberalization  is to succeed  in the
long run, it is important  to study  the evolution  of
* when the economy  was facing  a large  the real exchange  rate and measures  to stabilize
negative  external  shock  because  of faling terms  it.
of trade and rising  debt payments;
In the final section  of the paper, de Melo and
• after several  decades  of protectionism;  and  Dhar study  the recent impetus  toward trade
liberalization  through regional  arrangements  in
* under severe  macroeconomic  imbalances.  Latin America.  The issue is relevant  to countries
in Eastern  Europe  and the former  Soviet Union
De Melo and Dhar study the reform  package  because  they belonged  to the CMEA,  a regional
of trade liberalization,  stabilization,  and support-  trading  arrangement,  and because  such arrange-
ing policies  in Argentina,  Bolivia,  Chile,  ments are evolving  anew among  countries  in the
Mexico,  and Uruguay. They  conclude  that for  former  Soviet  Union.
the economies  in transition:
- Rationalizing  the foreign  trade  regime is
crucial  for the success  of stabilization  measures.
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conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent of ficial Bank policy.
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1.  Introduction
The literature on the relationship  between trade regimes and economic  performance  has relied
on Latin America as the example  of the effects of inward-looking  or import substitution
industrialization  (ISI) and East Asia as the example  of outward-looking  or export-led growth (ELG).
Until the early eighties  this was essentially  the case. With the exception  of Chile's successful trade
liberalization  carried out in the mid-seventies,  Latin America still fitted the description  of ISI at the
time of the debt crisis in 1981.
With the onset of the debt crisis, the shortcomings  of the ISI strategy could no longer be
hidden, and a move towards outward orientation  took place in Latin America.  In many ways the
conditions  under which trade liberalization  took place (a large negative  external shock due to the
combination  of falling terms of trade and rising debt payments)  are quite similar in magnitude  to those
facing East European (EE) and and Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries. A review of how trade
liberalization  and macroeconomic  adjustment  were carried out is relevant for economies  in transition.
Slowly throughout  the eighties, several countries carried out comprehensive  trade liberalizations.
Like previous failed attempts,  these were undertaken from crisis situations  with several
macroeconomic  imbalances  reflected in large fiscal deficits and high inflation. Yet, unlike several
previous attempts  at trade liberalization  which had been short-lived, this time there are no signs of
reversal so far.  Indeed, trade liberalization  spread across the region and today, the majority  of Latin
American countries show strong signs of having overcome  the legacy of four decades  of ISI.  At the
same time, Latin America's privatization  of State Owned  Enterprises (SOEs) has been strong as it
accounted  for 37 percent of SOEs sold in the developing  world between 1980 and 1991 (in 1980
SOEs accounted  for 12 percent of GDP in Latin America).2
Another dimension in which the recent experience  of Latin America is relevant for economies
In transition is that unlike East Asia, the move towards  outward-orientation  took place after many
decades  of high protectionism. And, unlike East Asia (but like Latin America), EE and FSU
countries  are liberalizing  under conditions  of severe macroeconomic  imbalances. Besides being
market economies  rather than centrally planned  economies,  the major difference with the current
situation  in EE and FSU countries is that the recent move towards outward orientation  in Latin
America took place against a background  of several failed attempts  which lowered the initial
credibility  of the reform packages.
The remainder  of the paper is in three sections. To set the stage, section 2 draws some
comparisons  on aggregate  performance  between  the two extreme cases: Latin America and East Asia.
This comparison  gives a feel for the long-term consequences  of differences  in trade orientation  (and
other supporting  policies) on overall performance. Section  3 then describes  briefly the recent trade
liberalization  measures that were carried out in five countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and
Uruguay. In all cases, trade liberalization  was carried out simultaneously  with stabilization  and other
reforms.  We describe briefly supporting  policies, as the success of trade liberalization  depends
crucially  on the design of the entire reform package.  We close in section 4 with a discussion  of the
recent impetus  towards trade liberalization  achieved  through regional arrangements. This should be
of relevance  to the current situation  in some EE and FSU countries since the CMEA was in effect a
regional  trading arrangement  and the issue of the trading arrangements  among FSU countries is likely
to be a continuing issue for debate.
As a prelude, we give the main lessons  from each country experience. Argentina's
experience  is an example  of persistent macroeconomic  imbalance  (arge fiscal deficits and high
inflation)  leading, until recently, to several reversals  of partial trade liberalization  efforts.  Bolivia is
an example  of how one can carry out an orthodox stabilization  program (without  resort to an income3
policy and temporary wage and price controls)  to wipe out hyperinflation  while simultaneously
carrying out trade liberalization. Chile is an example  of the economic  success story one would like to
..ee  everywhere  (in spite of a difficult  period of adjustment  and a delicate transition from authoritarian
rule to democracy). Mexico illustrates  how the prospects of regional integration with a stable and
developed  neighbor can help cement impressive  stabilization  and liberalization  policies.  And Uruguay
illustrates  the difficulty  of carrying out trade (and other) reforms in an economy  with a long tradition
of rent seeking  activities.
At the outset of any exercise  on lessons  to be drawn from the Latin American experience  with
trade liberalization,  a word of caution is in order.  The region is known for its many policy reversals
over the years.  Therefore all the encouraging  signs that are voiced in this paper should be interpreted
cautiously,  especially  for Argentina, where reforms have only been in effect for three years.  Also,
unresolved  losses of the banking system are significant  in all five countries and could pose a threat for
the success of the ongoing reforms.  So could  the loss of competitiveness  through real exchange  rate
appreciation  for the countries that have used the exchange  rate to reduce inflation.
2.  Trade and Growth in Latin America:  A Comparative Perspective
It is now widely accepted  that, controlling  for other factors, more open economies  - in the
sense of less distortions  in their foreign trade regimes  - grow faster.'  More open economies  both
discriminate  less against tradable activities  than closed  economies, and within tradable activities, they
T'he  evidence  of higher growth for open economies  based on country studies and on cross-
section  regression analysis  is overwhelming. For a recent entry point in that literature, see e.g.
Dollar (1992) and references therein.4
avoid creating  what is referred to as "home  market bias", that is, they avoid discriminating  against
exporting  activities and in favor of import substituting  activities  that cater to the domestic market. 2
Why do more open economies  grow faster (after controlling  for other factors)? Here the
arguments  rely on microeconomic  analysis  at the firm level and for which it is much harder to get
conclusive  evidence, even though it is widely perceived  that the facts support the reasoning. It is
generally  agreed that liberalization  in highly distorted  economies improves  existing resource allocation
across sectors, across flrms in a sector, and within  firms in a sector.  In a dynamic  sense,
liberalization  is also intended to improve the efficiency  of investment  by allocating  it to activities  that
are profitable  under incentives  free of egregious  distortions  (for a further elaboration  of the sources of
inefficiency  arising out of a distorted incentive  structure, see box 1).  Thus, it has often been
observed that more open economies  have both higher GDP growth rates, and higher growth rates of
total factor productivity  (TFP).  TFP is defined as the difference  between output growth and a factor
share weighted  growth of inputs (this difference is also known as the "residual" - a measure  of the
unexplained  source of output growth). 3
Figure 1 compares  the evolution of GDP, export, and import growth for the Latin America
and East Asia regions (all figures are weighted  by country shares in their respective  regions).  Over
the period 1970-89,  GDP growth was consistently  higher in East Asia.  In particular  the gap in
2  Tradable  activities are those activities  that are potentially  exchanged internationally.
Nontradables,  on the other hand, are activities  that are not exchanged  internationally  because of high
transportation  (or storage) costs.  Examples  of nontradables  activities are construction,  utilities and
services like haircuts.  Typically, about one half of GDP is classified as nontradables. The distinction
between  the two types of activities and the evolution  of their relative price between the two (known  as
the real exchaunge  rate or relative price of nontradables)  is very important  for following  the evolution
of a country's external  balance.
3  For a further discussion  of the link between  trade policy and TFP, see Havrylyshyn  (1990) and
Tybout  (1992).5
Box 1:  Sources of InefficMency  In Highly Regulated Economies'
To name a few of the effects of excessive  regulation,  finns become less than efficient, as they
are restricted in the choice of their optimum  output and input mix.  To begin with, these frms  are
constrained  in their input markets. Adjustments  in their work forces are impeded  by labor legislation.
Management  of inventories  Is complicated  by uncertainty  about whether  and when the firms will be
able to import spare parts and raw materials. Nor are enterprises  sure about how much capital they
will have access to - and at what cost.  Firms in such economies  also operate in restricted  product
markets. There are barriers to the entry of foreign companies. There also are barriers to the entry of
new domestic  firms, for even if the cost of entry Is not a problem, access to capital may ba - because
the limited  pool of capital is parceled  out according  to long-standing  ties between existing  producers
and their creditors.  Barriers to entry, of course, benefit existing firms as they have more leeway in
their pricing policies.  The firms thus suffer from some of the restrictions and benefit from others.
Restrictions  in highly regulated  economies  include made-to-measure  prctection. This situation
guarantees  the coexistence  of firms with a wide dispersion of efficiency  within a sector, since the
level of protection is chosen to make the least efficient  firms profitable. As a result, many firms can
operate at a profit with dated machinery  and equipment.
In such economies,  most firms are inefficient. They use outmoded  technology  and use it
badly (technical  inefficiency). Too many of them operate at too small a scale (scale inefficiency).
They do not equate marginal  products with factor costs (allocatdve  inefficiency). Because consumers
have nowhere else to go, the leading firms can charge higher than normal mark-ups, with other firms
following  suit.  Firms therefore price their products above the marginal  cost of production (price
inefficiency). Under such conditions  the economy  becomes characterized  by idle capacity  and
unproductive  work forces.  In addition, the incentive  system is greatly distorted because protection
has been tailored for individual  products to ensure the survival  of firms already operating.
The made-to-measure  protection  usually includes  quantitative  restrictions  that result in
exceedingly  large rents and induce economic  agents to expend much of their effort appropriating  rents
rather than engaging  in activities  that would be more socially productive. Thus quantitative  controls
result in rents which in turn give rise to rent-seeldng  and lobbying activities  to capture these rents.
Resources  that would otherwise  be productively  used get diverted to chasing  these rents with
potentially  large welfare losses which could add up to the value of the rents.
1.  Source: Adapted  from V. Corbo and J. de Melo (1985) 'Introduction".6
Flgure 1 East Asia and Latin America
Growth Rates: GDP, EXPORTS,  DMPORTS
(3 Year Moving  Average)
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performance  between the two regions was staggering  during the 1980s. Taking into account
population  growth rates, average per capita  GDP growth during the 1980s  was 1.6 percent in Latin
America and 7.8 percent in East Asia.
Both regions felt the effects of the oil price shocks (1973, 1979) and the debt crisis (1981),
but the more flexible  East Asian economies  bore the brunt of the shock much better.  In terms of the
above  discussion,  the widening  gap in performance  throughout  the seventies  and eighties is
attributable  to the more flexible economic  structures associated  with open economies  that had less
distorted  incentive  structures. 4 Export growth rates were also consistently  higher in the East Asian
region.  Finally note the particularly strong correlation  between import  growth and GDP growth for
the Latin American region.  Tbis is what one would expect of economies  where two-thirds or more of
imports  are for intermediates  and capital goods not produced at home:  when a foreign exchange
crisis hits the economy, essential inputs for production can no longer be purchased  from abroad, and
output declines sharply.
The terms of trade loss for Latin America during 1982-86  (compared  with 1978-81)  was
between  3.8 percent and 4.5 percent of GDP (see Faini et al. 1991, table 2).  Interestingly  this
estimate  is about the same as the estimate  of the terms of trade loss (4 percent) experienced  by
Poland, Hungary  and Czechoslovakia  when they shifted  to world prices.  Figure 1 indicates  that Latin
America's average GDP growth during 1982-86  was 2.33 percentage  points below 1978-81  (which
were boom years because of unusually  large capital inflows). Of course, the entire loss in output
growth cannot be imputed to the effects of this terms of trade loss, since there was strong private
capital outflow during the debt crisis.
'  A more flexible economy  adjusts better to an external  shock than a more rigid economy
because  the costs in terms of idle resources during adjustment  is less.8
What accounts  for the much higher growth of East Asia? Figure 2 plots the contribution  of
factor input and TFP growth to GDP (or value-added)  growth for a sample of developed and
developing  countries. TFP growth is measured  on the vertical axis and total factor input growth on
the horizontal  axis.  Each isoline in figure 2 corresponds  to a different rate of GDP growth with
isolines  further from the origin indicating  higher GDP growth rates.  The figure Is divided into three
clusters: cluster A consists  mostly of developed  countries  in which TFP growth is the most important
contributing  factor to growth; cluster B has some developed  countries  and a number of Latin
American countries in which growth is mostly  due to factor accumulation;  and cluster C with East
Asian countries,  Japan and a few others where the high growth rates is due both to large contributions
of factor input growth and to TFP growth.
The contribution  of TFP growth to GDP growth cannot be overemphasized  even though it is
difficult  to pinpoint  its causes since it includes  not only the effects of differences in policies, but also
the acquisition  and mastering  of existing  technology,  technological  progress and other improvements
in production  activities. For example, in figure 2, Brazil and Korea had similar factor input growth
rates (around 6 percent) but Brazil grew at about 7 percent while Korea grew at close to 10 percent.
(The differences  between Venezuela,  and Hongkong  and Taiwan are even more striking).
In sum, these differences  in long-run growth performance  are due to a number of factors
including  more stable macroeconomic  policies, less distorted factor markets, and better functioning
institutions. But it is generally agreed that less distorted  foreign trade regimes resulting in more open
economies  are an important contributing  element  to superior economic  performance.9
Figure 2  Relatboship Between  Total Factor Productivity Growth and
Total Factor Input Growth
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3.  Recent Trade Liberalization  Episodes5
We now turn to a brief description  of the recent trade liberalization  episodes in Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay.  The emphasis  is on conveying  a sense of the magnitudes  of
the trade reforms and, of the country's initial macroeconomic  conditions  at the time of the trade
reforms, and of the accompanying  policies (e.g. privatization  of SOEs, labor and capital market
deregulation,  etc.).  We give two sets of indicators  on a comparative  basis.  For background
information,  table I gives three year average values for standard macroeconomic  indicators for the
period 1980-90.1 Three year averages remove some of the volatility of the series but masks the
turning  points following  the reforms. Figure 3 compares  the evolution  of a GDP index (centered  with
1980 =  100 for all countries)  and a measure of openness  (the ratio of exports to GDP) for the period
1970-91.
Argentina (table 2).  Argentina  is the classic case of a succession  of failed attempts at trade
liberalization. In all attempts,  trade liberalization  was accompanied  by stabilization  policies to reduce
fiscal deficits and inflation. In several failed attempts,  inconsistencies  between monetary and
exchange  rate policy (which was used as an anti-inflationary  device) led to sharp real exchange rate
appreciation  (a rise in the relative price of nontradables)  that was not sustainable  because  of the sharp
loss in competitiveness  of the traded sectors.  Often, these attempts  ended with quantitative
restrictions  (QRs) to stem growing  balance of payments  deficits and wage-price  freezes to try and
curb inflation.
s In most cases, events are covered until 1991. For more details on Argentina, Chile and
Mexico, see Nogues and Gulati (1992).
6  Indicators for the size of the fiscal deficit and unemployment,  are probably  the least reliable,
and should be interpreted  with extreme caution.11
Tablek  I  M  Indis
(average  per perio)
Argentina  Bolivia  Cbile  Mexico  UmgUuay
1980/  19W  1988  19801  19W  1988  1980/  19841  19881  1980/  19W  1988/  19801  1984t  1988
Years  83  87  90  83  87  90  83  87  90  83  87  90  83  87  90
I  Growth  rateof GNP/  - 4.0  -0.02  3.8  *  5.8  -4.1  -0.S  -4.0  4.1  4.3  -0.1  -1.6  2.2  -3.9  3.6  0.2
capita
n  Gross domestic  17.8  12.4  9.7  12.8  9.1  12.7  16.2  14.7  18.9  24.6  19.8  17.4  14.3  9.0  9.S
investment/GDP  (%)
m Government  deficite  -5.9  -9.3  -8.9  -21.1  -10.3  - 1.12  2.9  -0.3  - 4.3  -11.6  -10.6  -7.3  - 3.6  -2.2  - 1.54
(-) or  rplus/GDP
(5)
IV Unemployment  rate  4.0  4.7  6.9  10.1  18.4  19.0  14.4  12.1  6.9  5.1t  4.7  3.0  10.3  11.9  9 1b
V  Inflation  (rate of  178.3  380.1  1932.1  119.6  3274.0  16.1  21.1  20.1  20.5  54.0  85.2  53.6  41.4  66.9  85.0
change  in CPI)
VI Total  external  debh/  68.3  74.7  82.4  113.8  160.4  105.3  67.7  130.8  82.5  45.5  69.3  49.9  33.4  72.1  50.0
GNP (%)  [50.71  (65.51  138.31  (45.3)  [45.71  (40.01  (58.41  (47.41  (25.51  [52.41  [49.51  (37.9]  (23.3]  137.1]  [36.4]
(Total  debt service/




d.  For Argentina  and Mexico,  figures  are for the public  sector  borrowing  requirement  (PSBR).
Source: World  Tables,  World  Development  Report,  Internatonal  Fdancial Statistics,  World  Debt  Tables,  Yearbook  of Labor  Statitics.12
Figure 3  Openness  and GDP Indicators
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Table 2  Reforms  in Argentina
Period  Growing contros  Fmaneiu1  reforms  Restrictions  Expot  Deregulation  Acceierated
1950-1976  and panial  1982  -1914  promotion  1988 - 1989  libralization
liberalization  1985-  1987  1990-
1976-1981  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Ovcrall  policy  Impor substiuting  Military tkever  in  Debt erisis  1982  Austral Stabilisation  (  Failure of Primevera  Privatization;
environment  industrialisation  (ISI)  Marcb 1976  Foland  War 1982  7 months):  Stabilisetion  (I  fiscal sector
Democracy  restored 1983  devaluation, wage-  year);  adjusamenl
price freeze, upward  hyperinflation  loan inflation;
adjusment of public
sector  prices  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
External factors
Trade policy
Imports  Maximum tariff rate of  Maximum tariff lowered  In 1985 import licenses cover 52.1  % of  In 1988 tenporary  Specific tariff;  Specific tariff
200%;  to 55% from 100%  in  production  of tradcables; 10% surchargc;  prohibitions  removed;  maximum tariff rate  abolished; 3 tier
19s2; average tariff was  prohibition and prior approval for  15%  surchargc;  22%; surcharge  tariff (22%,  11%,
30.2%;  impott  licenses  impons.  import licnses  cover  abolished;  O%); few QRs
cover 4.3% of  32% of production  of  remaia (on cars);
production  of trdeables.  tradeabers;  unweighted mean
Boom-bust  cycle (see  tariff rate is 15%
box 2 and figure 3)  in 1992;
Exports  Targeted export  Programas Especiales  de Exportacion for  Special schemes for  Phasing out expot
diversification; export taxes  nontraditional  exports (In 198087 US  export promotion  subsidies;
S36S3m  paid as export subsidies).  continued
Exchange rate  Active erawl (1978-81)  Foreign exchange rationing  Fxed exchange rate  Fied,  then flxible  1990; raed





Examples of failed attempts  include  the "open import liberalization"  policy during 1976-82
under the military, when it was believed  that pressures from foreign competition  under the exchange-
rate-based  stabilization  program would help reduce oligopolistic  pricing behavior.  In the end the
stabilization  program had to be abandoned  as the use of the exchange rate to reduce inflationary
expectations  (the government  was pre-announcing,  up to six months in advance, future rates of
devaluation  at less than the differential  between  domestic and foreign inflation)  had resulted in too
much loss of confidence  in the exchange  rate.  Capital flight (outflow)  set in when the private sector
realized that the loss of competitiveness  and resulting current account  deficit was no longer
sustainable. The inconsistency  of exchange  rate policy and fiscal policy also played an important  role
in the failure of all Argentine  stabilization  plans.
In Latin America, the underlying  cause of rising inflation  was almost always large increases
in the fiscal deficit so that reducing  fiscal deficit  reduction is then a prerequisite  for eliminating
inflation.'  Yet, eliminating  inflation  has often  proved very difficult. Figure 4 shows the outcome  of
the exchange-rate  approach  to reducing inflation  in the case of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay when it
was tried for the first time around in late 1978 (since then it has been used many times).  It also
illustrates  the difficulty  of coordinating  stabilization  and liberalization  policies (for details of the
episode, see box 2).
The use of the exchange  rate to reduce inflation in the three countries was started at the end
of 1978. Initial conditions  were different (see box 2), but the pattern of GDP growth, real interest
rates and real exchanges  was strikingly  similar.  Three phases are apparent.  In a first phase, the real
7  Of course fiscal deficits are not always the result of autonomous  increases in spending. Often
they occur because of difficulties  in reducing  components  of spending when there is an unanticipated
rise in debt service payments and it is difficult for political and economic  reasons to raise tax
revenues.15
Box 2.  Experiences  with Zxchange Rate-Based  Stabilizatioo
Ladn American countries have typically liberalized trade while simultaneously  trying to reduce inflation.
Figure 3 shows the outcome of stabilization during 1978-82 for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay while they
simultaneously  used a pre-announced exchange rate to reduce inflationary expectations.  This box gives further details
about the outcome of this experiment.
At the start of this policy, Argentina's public sector deficit was still almost 10 percent of GDP; Chile still
had a wage indexation mechanism that was bound to result in a real appreciation of the exchange rate; and Uruguay's
fiscal deficit increased substantially  in 1981.  The anti-inflationary programs in all three countries were flawed.
As noted in the text, domestic demand grew faster than output in the three countries with the gap filled by
foreign finance.  The demand pressures on nontradables lead to a real exchange rate appreciation and limited the
effectiveness of anti-inflationary  policies.  In Chile, the annual inflation rate was reduced from 50 percent in 1978 to
20 percent in 1981 and to zero in early 1982, but the accumulated  real appreciation of the peso was large.
Argentina's inflation rate only fell from 175 percent in 1978 to 101 percent in 1980.  Inflation eventually fell to 63.5
percent in 1980 and 34.0 percent in 1981.
In all three countries, increased imports and loss of export competitiveness combined to raise the current
account deficit.  In Chile, the deficit rose from 5.6 percent of GDP in 1977-78 to 9.1 percent in 1979-81; Argentina
moved from a current account surplus equal to 2.1 percent of GDP  in 1976-78 to a deficit of 1.8 percent in 1979-80;
and in Uruguay the deficit increased from 3.2 percent of GDP  in 1977-78 to 5.4 percent in 1979-8  1.  Because all
three economies were booming, the average unemployment rate was reduced from 14.2 percent to 13.6 percent in
Chile, from 12.4 percent to 8.4 percent in Uruguay and from 3.4 percent to 2.2 percent in Argentina.
As real exchange rate appreciation continued so doubts grew about the sustainability of the exchange rate
policy.  These doubts were reflected in growing interest rate spreads despite the shrinking (Chile) or absence
(Argentina and Uruguay) of impediments  to short-term capital flows.  Real interest rates rose sharply, adding to the
difficulties of the tradable goods sectors.  Companies were doing more and more borrowing to stave off bankruptcy
and awaiting a bailout after devaluation.
The inconsistency in the three countries' economic  policies became apparent in late 1980 in Argentina and in
early 1982 in Chile and Uruguay.  In Argentina, with an externally financed public sector deficit of over 10 percent
of GDP and no prospect of fiscal reform, doubts about the sustainability of the exchange rate regime began as early as
the first half of 1980.  They were increased by the collapse in April 1980 of the largest commercial bank which
prompted a 25 percent increase in the money supply in a single month.
In Chile, despite a fiscal surplus in 1979-81  equal to 2.1 percent of GDP, the current account deficit reached
14.6 percent of GDP  in 1981.  Doubts about the sustainability of the exchange rate started to set in, with inflows of
private capital decreasing from US$1.6 billion in the second half of 1981 to only US$900 million in the first half of
1982.  The monetary contraction that followed resulted in high interest rates and a sharp recession.
In Uruguay, the fiscal deficit (which had fallen continuously through 1980) started to increase in 1981 with
an underfunded  social security reform.  Meanwhile, the real exchange rate rose by 27.4 percent between 1978 and
1981  - and even more  'tive  to Argentina, after the latter's stabilization attempt collapsed.  As doubts grew about
the sustainability  of the tanlita (the pre-announced devaluation  schedule), so outflows of private capital started to
increase in 1981 (de Melo 1987).  Thus capital flight started in Argentina and Uruguay (and to a lesser extent in
Chile) before their economies were hit by the adverse external developments of the early 1980s.
* See figure 4.16
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Sore  Corbo and de Melo (1987).17
interest rate (in pesos) fell, stimulating  aggregate  demand (accelerating  GDP growth) and a real
exchange  appreciation. It was hoped that as inflation  fell both the real interest rate and the real
exchange  rate would move to their long run equilibrium  values. In the second phase, a continuing
real exchange  rate appreciation  was observed with real interest rates starting to rise, partly reflecting
higher expectation  of devaluation. The continued real exchange  rate appreciation  stimulated  aggregate
demand (and GDP growth), while the increase in real interest rates stimulated  short term capital
inflows. With competitiveness  deteriorating, the current account deficit widened, while domestic
borrowers found it preferable  to shift to dollar-denominated  debt.  Finally, in a third phase, when loss
of credibility  set in and the private sector no longer believed  in the pre-announced  exchange rate
policy, capital outflow set in, triggering a foreign exchange  crisis, the abandonment  of exchange  rate
based disinflation,  and a return of inflation.
With the return of democracy  in 1983, economic  policies temporarily  took second place and
Argentina  continued  to have large fiscal imbalances,  high inflation,  high tariff protection  (maximum
tariff of 55 percent), export taxes (amounting  to 14 percent of export revenues)  and import licensing
covering  over 50 percent of imports in 1985. Between 1980 and 1989, average yearly inflation  was
395.4 percent and Argentina, with its long history of inflation  belonged  to the category of "chronic
inflation"  countries where stabilization  is especially  difficult  to carry out because of widespread
indexation.
Another attempt at stabilization  took place in June 1985  with the "Austral" plan (the Austral
was the new currency that was introduced as part of this heterodox  stabilization  package that included
a wage-price  freeze with a large devaluation  upfront).  The fixing of the exchange rate and the wage-18
price freeze was meant to be temporary and to stabilize  prices, nQi  to,  fix prices. 8 For seven months,
the government  managed  to refrain from financing  the deficit by printing money, and trade
liberalization  took the form of intensive export  promotion coupled  with a reduction in licensing
requirements  for imports (only 32 percent of the tariff positions remained subject  to prior approval)
and all temporary restrictions  on imports had been removed. However, when once more, the
government  failed to achieve  fiscal restraint, tariff surcharges  on imports  (up to 15 percent) were
applied  and by 1988 weighted  average protection  was 40 percent.  Currency overvaluation  and
hyperinflation  set in once more with a peak annual inflation  rate of 20,000 percent in early 1990, and
a staggering annual average rate of consumer  inflation  of 450 percent for the decade ending in 1990.
During that decade, income per capita fell by more than 20 percent and the investment  rate slumped
from 23 percent to 8 percent.
With a new government in 1989, stronger support for trade liberalization  led to a progressive
reduction of export subsidies  and removal of import licensing. The surcharge on imports was
abolished  and the maximum  tariff rate on imports  was reduced from 50 percent to 22 percent.  At the
beginning  of 1991  there was further progress towards trade liberalization  with the abolishment  of
specific tariffs and most non-tariff  barriers to trade.  Quantitative  restrictions  still exist in the
automobile  sector and industrial  promotion regimes. Tariff rates of 22 percent, 11 percent and 0
percent were applied to all imports  and a schedule for the progressive phasing out of export and
industrial  subsidies was adopted. Average  protection  is now 9 percent and the only remaining  QR is
on autos.
s  The experience  of the Austral plan bears similarities  with the Polish stabilization  plan of 1990
when a fixed exchange (with a large upfront devaluation)  was introduced. As in many Latin
American experiences  with exchange-rate-based  stabilzation there was initial overshooting  (probably
necessary  to reduce inflation expectations)  that resulted in large export increases  and a large reduction
in imports. Because of inflation  inertia, the exchange  rate eventually  became  overvalued, export and
import growth trends were reversed, and the zloty was devalued in May 1991.19
The cornerstone  of the latest attempt  at stabilization  was the reduction of the fiscal deficit and
the adoption  of supply-side  reforms to increase  competition  and efficient  functioning  of critical
enterprises. The telephone  network, the state airline, railway lines and two television  stations  have
been privatized and the government intends  to sell off at least 51 percent of all SOEs. 9 At the same
time pay bargaining was decentralized,  and barriers to entry in markets were removed  while the VAT
base was widened and tax compliance  increased. As in the case of Chile discussed  below, the key to
success  so far has been widespread  reforms accompanying  the trade liberalization. It might be added
that the needed political support for these tough reforms materialized  because inflation  had become
intolerable  and the public was ready for change  after years of economR;  decline.
In April 1991, in another extremely important  macroeconomic  measure, a Convertibility  Act
required by law that the monetary  base be 100  percent backed by gold and foreign currency reserves
fixed the exchange  rate to the dollar and banned indexation  of wages and contracts.  As of the middle
of 1992, there is considerable  optimism about  the success of this approach  to stabilization  and
widespread  popular support for the wide ranging market reforms.  Bolstered  by the success so far
(annual  inflation  of about 30 percent and GDP growth of about 5 percent per year forecasted  for
1992-93),  in January 1992 the government  returned from the Austral to the peso now worth $1.
There remain, however, some fears that the fixed exchange  rate will have to be abandoned  if there is,
once more, a sharp deterioration  of the current account caused by real exchange rate appreciation,  if
current capital inflows are not sustainable  over the medium run.'  Tbere is concern that the loss in
9  About half of the fiscal deficit was caused by SOEs, with losses amounting  to 9 percent of
GDP in 1989.  The proceeds  of these recent privatizations  amounted to 1.4 percent of 1990 GDP.
'°  In 1991, gross private capital inflows to Latin America were estimated at US$40 billion,
equivalent  to 4 percent of GDP.  There is renewed  concern that these inflows are, once more, eroding
the competitiveness  of the export sector, as they did during the first phase of the boom-bust  cycle of
1978-81  (described  in box 2 above). The private capital inflow to Argentina  was US$5.2 billion in
1991. Fifty percent of this amount was foreign direct investment  and portfolio capital.20
competitiveness  of domestic industry may be beyond the levels of competitiveness  that could be
supported after restructuring has raised domestic firm efficiency. Whether this stage has been reached
or not is an open question. However, insofar as this time the fiscal deficit had been quasi eliminated
and monetary expansion  automatically  controlled, an exchange  rate adjustment  would not necessarily
have to result in a new inflationary  spiral, as it did invariably  did in the past, since credibility would
be much greater than in the past.
Bolivia (table 3).  Bolivia is a small landlocked  economy  with an enclave  in mine-related
activities. Its experience  is interesting  for some of the small landlocked  FSU countries which have
few opportunities  in the short-run to export anything  else than natural-resource-based  products. It is
also interesting  because, unlike the other Latin American  economies  that reached hyperinflation,
Bolivia was never a chronic inflation  economy. As a result, the economy  did not have widespread
indexation,  and  an orthodox  (i.e. no control  of prices  and  no incomes  policies)  approach  to
stabilization  worked.
A typical boom-bust  cycle took place in the late seventies  when favorable international
markets for minerals attracted foreign capital that led to the discovery  of hydrocarbon  deposits and
capital inflows that averaged 50 percent of exports during 1975-78. At the time, the mining,
hydrocarbon  and energy sectors were nationalized  and key industrial plants in manufacturing  were in
the hands of the public sector.  Domestic  markets were ridden with price controls and marketing
boards. Foreign exchange was allocated  by non-market  mechanisms  to specific sectors which also
received  subsidized  credit and the foreign  trade regime had a complex system of tariffs and quotas.
By mid-1985,  the public sector deficit reached 25 percent of GDP and the inflation  rate was
28,000 percent.  Fixed investment  had fallen from 14 percent to 7 percent of GDP.  The stabilization
program of August 1985 included a massive devaluation,  the unification  of the official and parallel
market exchange  rates and an auction to determine  the competitive  equilibrium  exchange  rate.  Thus,21
Table 3  Reforms in Bolivia
Periods  Rcvolution  Favourable  Crisis yea  Refoms  Aflenmath  Recent measures
1952-1958  trade climate  1978-1985  1985-1986  1987-1989  1989-1991
1959-1978
Oveall policy  Agmran rcnrm;  Key industries  in  No coherent  economic  Reform  of the finial  sector,  Decree of pivsation  for
environment  Nationalistion of  public sector, price  policy;  labour  markt,  tax ansctu,  publc sector industries
Mines  controb;  polical  iility  Removal  of price controls;
subsidised  credt,  reduction  of goverment
political stabiliy 1971-  expenditure
78;
External factors  Favourable  World  Debt build up  Decine of tin (1986)  Lack of
Market for Mineash;  revaluation  of debt  and natural gas prices  infastructur
servicing  and expoit  (1987)  Unainity  about the
Discovery  of  capacity  by external  permanen c of the
._______________  hydrocarbon  deposits  lenders  reforms
Trade  policy
Impods  CompleCX  system of  Maximum  tariff of 20%;  Maximum  taif  of 10%;
tariffs and quotas;  licensing  abolished;  tariff of 5% on capital
goods; few QRs rmn  (on
sugar, edib  oils, wheat
flour); unweighted  mean
tariff rate is 8% in 1992; the
range of taiff is between  5
to 10%.
Exports  10% rebate to nontadiionl  Scheme  for  Duty drwbak  wheme
exportrs  noditional
Allocation  of foreign  Overvaluation  of  expods;
Exchange  rate  exchange  exchange  rate  Massive  devaluation;  unification
and market detemination of
exchange  rate
Main results  High infation;  Large investments  of  Fail in real GDP of  Fiscal dericit reduced;  inflation  Stagnation  of  Growing  at 2-digi kvels
GDP gmrth  <2%;  exterl  capital; GDP  10% in 1980-1985;  brought  under control  invcstment  and  Nonuaditional  exports;
income redistribution  growth 5%  very high inflation  rate  exports,  pubLic  sector deficit
and budge deficit;  GDP grwth  of 2.7%  reduced  to 3.3%;
shaup  fal in exporb  inflation  rate 17%
am invcstment  GDP gowth of 4.0% in
199122
unlike the other stabilization  programs described  in this paper, the stabilization  did not rely upon a
fixing of the exchange  rate.  Concurrently  with the foreign exchange auction, interest rates were freed
and controls on capital flows were lifted.  Government  expenditure  reduction, tax reform, increases  in
public sector prices, elimination  of price controls and subsidies were the complementary  measures  that
made the stabilization  successful. By 1986, the inflation  rate was down to 66 percent and the average
yearly rate of inflation  since 1987 has been 18.7 percent.  Quite remarkably,  Bolivia has not reversed
its policies in spite of a collapse  of the mineral  markets in 1986 and of hydrocarbons  in 1987.
At the same time, Bolivia entered a comprehensive  trade liberalization  program.  Import
licensing  was abolished, all QRs were eliminated  (except  for sugar and edible oil) and in 1985  the
maximum  tariff rate was lowered to 20 percent.  By 1991  the maximum  tariff rate was 10 percent,
and the 10 percent rebate for imported inputs provided  to nontraditional  exporters  was replaced by a
duty drawback  system.
While Bolivia's stabilization  program was highly successful, and the Bolivian  government
carried out all the structural adjustment  programs that are usually advocated,  growth performance  has
been mixed.  GDP growth has averaged  2.7 percent between 1987 and 1990, and it was only in 1991
that GDP growth reached 4 percent.  Also investment  response has been slow with private share
stagnating  at 4 percent of GDP till 1989. The private investment  rate grew at 4 percent in 1990. The
relative slow supply response  to reforms in Bolivia is an example  of the time that it can take for
reforms to bear fruit.
Even though it took time for investment  and GDP growth to pick up, the Bolivian reforms
resulted in a strong performance  on the export side.  Private sector mining grew rapidly,
compensating  for the decline in public sector mining, and non-traditional  exports have grown at
double-digit  levels since 1987. Thus there was a strong supply response  to the reforms in Bolivia23
even  though the pace of recovery was somewhat  slower than in the cases of Argentina, Chile, or
Mexico.
aCle (table 4).  Chile is heralded as the success story of trade liberalization  as it has the most
transparent and open trade regime in Latin America and carried out sweeping  reforms (removal  of
price controls, widespread  privatization,  stabilization),  while simultaneously  liberalizing  its foreign
trade regime."
Following a takeover by the military when the economy  was in chaos (an average inflation  of
150 percent and an average fiscal deficit of 16 percent of GDP during 1971-73),  the government
carried out its bold reforms.  In September 1973, at the time of the takeover, tariffs ranged up to 750
percent with an average weighted  tariff of 105 percent and prohibitive  prior import deposit
requirements. By June of 1979, virtually all quantitative  restrictions  had been abolished  and a
uniform  tariff of 10 percent was established. During the 1983 financial  crisis that followed  the
poorly-designed  exchange-rate-based  stabilization  policy (see box 2), the uniform  tariff was raised 20
percent, then again to 35 percent in 1984  (a higher rate was not adopted  as Chile had joined the
GATI), before being brought progressively  to 11 percent by June 1991.12
Unlike  many other Latin American countries, Chile has not used export subsidies  to try to
counteract  the bias against export activities  that occurs when protection  is high.  The approach of a
low uniform  tariff and no export  subsidies  has the advantage  of transparency  and of avoiding
incentives  to try and obtain subsidies  (e.g. overinvoicing  of exports). Chile has, however, introduced
some export promotion policies in recent years.  These include: (i) an extension  of the drawback
"1 For a detailed description  and thorough interpretation  of the 1973-83  period, see Edwards and
Edwards (1987).
32  Chile has adopted tariff surcharges as antidumping  policy for a few products, and there has
been some use of reference prices. The protective effects of these measures  have not been measured
yet.24
Table  4  Refonns  in Chile
1950-70  1970-73  1974-76  1977-2  1983-1991
Overall  Import  substitution.  Populist  policies  Military  takeover  Labor  union  activity  Return  of democracy  in
Stable  democracy  Sale  of public  enterprises  suppressed  since  late 1973  1988  (0)
Land  reform  (500  sold  by 1979)  now  allowed;  full  wage
indexation
External  Lae  terms  of trade  loss  Global  limits  on external  Improvemet  in terms  of
(exteral shock  of 15%  brrowig  prgresssively  trade  starting  in 1987
of GDP)  elimited
Trade  policy
Imports  High  effective  Quotas;  average  protection  Removal  of QRs,  Witdxrawal  from  Andean  Average  protection  up to
protction  to  of 105%  maximum  tariff  of 35%  Pact. Tariff  of 10%  by  35%  then  down  to 10%;
manulacturing  (360%  in  June  1979  unweighted  mean  tariff
1967); QRs  rate is I1I%  in 1992,
QRs  removed.
Exports
Exchange  rate  Multiple  exchange  rate  Crawling  peg  1978-82  preannounced  Some  export  promotion
system  exchange  rate.  policies.  Copper
stabilization  fund
Crawling  peg
Main  results  GDP  growth  of 3.89%  Average  fiscal  deficit  of  Negative  growth;  Growth  picks  up; huge  Financial  crisis  in 1983.
16%  and 150%  inflation.  reduction  in fiscal  deficit  capital  inflows  leading  to  Collapse  in 1982-83
and  inflation  large  real  exchange  rate  (159%  decline  in  GDP).
appreciation  and  crisis  in  Strong  growth  starting  in
eady 1982  1985. Large  FDI  flows.25
system introduced in 1988; (ii) exemption  from the stamp  tax for export business; (iii) delayed
payments of duties on capital goods; (iv) the introduction  in 1983 of a temporary admission  regime;
(v) a 10 percent of export value reimbursement  for small exporters since 1985; and (vi) the creation
in 1987  of a small fund for export financing.
Of the five countries, Chile opened  up its economy  the most to foreign trade.  The effects  of
this trade liberalization  on the openness of the economy  (measured  by the ratio of exports to GDP)
and on growth is impressive, especially  when compared with the other countries (see figure 3).  The
cornerstone  of Chile's success  reflected in higher growth and booming exports has been the ability  to
reduce the fiscal deficit and provide a stable macroeconomic  environment  for exports through a
sustained  an  stable real exchange  rate that guarantees  the profitability  of exporting. This, of course,
also means a competitive  real wage.  At the same time, an open import regime was also very
important  for the success of Chile's trade liberalization,  as were the accompanying  reforms that led to
well-functioning  labor markets. The end results have been impressive  with substantial  increases in
TFP growth and more competitive  product markets (as would be suggested by the discussion  in box 1
and figure 2).
Some of the effects of the reforms on manufacturing-sector  performance  are revealed  by
comparing concentration  and profitability  ratios in two census years:  1967 and 1979. In 1967, the
average price-cost margin for manufacturing  - a measure of oligopolistic  behavior - was 48 percent.
In 1979, when the trade liberalization  has been completed  and uniform 10 percent tariff had been
adopted, the price cost margin had fallen to 32 percent.  At the same time, many firms had exited,
and concentration  rose sharply.  Further analysis  showed  that the reforms had resulted in contestable
markets in manufacturing  and that there was an "import-discipline"  effect, namely that, after
controlling  for other factors, sectors which experienced  the highest import penetration rates were
those that experienced  the largest decline in price-cost margins. Finally, during the early 1980s,  the26
process of rationalization  engendered  by trade liberalization  (and other reforms) led to the exit of the
least efficient  firms and to an increase in TFP growth." 3
A relevant aspect of the Chilean experience  for FSU countries  was the large-scale
privatization  that took place in the early years of the military takeover.  In 1973, 39 percent of GDP
was in the hands of SOEs.  By 1989, only 12 percent of GDP was produced by SOEs, and the gross
proceeds of privatization  are estimated  at 12 percent of 1989  GDP.  However, the rapid privatization
of the mid-1970s  was accompanied  by large-scale  bankruptcies  during the debt crisis of the early
1980s. While faulty macroeconomic  policies carry part of the blame, the lack of a proper regulatory
framework  led to the build-up  of a few large conglomerates  ("grupos") involving  interlocking
ownerships  with commercial  banks that delayed adjustment  substantially  [see Galvez and Tybout
(1986)].14
Of the five countries, Chile experienced  the highest rate of transitional  unemployment.
During the 1960s,  the "natural" rate of unemployment  was around 5-6 percent, and it was only
towards  the end of the 1980s  that unemployment  returned to these historical  levels.  Thus there was a
relatively  long period of high unemployment  in the 15-25  percent range." 5 While there is
disagreement  about the specific  numbers, it is generally agreed that, prior to the 1982-84  crisis, a
large part of the unemployment  was attributable  to the effects of contractionary  stabilization  policies
and then of layoffs following  the closing  up of public enterprises. However, about 3.5 percentage
13  For more details see de Melo and Urata (1986) and Tybout (1992).
14  Interlocking  ownership in itself should not be a cause of concern, if ownership  of firms by
commercial  banks is properly supervised, as in Germany  and Japan.
Is The figures in table 1 understate  the level of unemployment  as they do not include people in
the public employment  programs. When these are included  the average, the average unemployment
during 1980-83  was 22.4 percent and, during 1984-87, 19.5 percent.  See Meller (1991, table 9).27
points of unemployment  has been attributed  to the restructuring  that accompanied  trade
liberalization." 6
While the success  of Chile's trade liberalization  is the classic example  of what is to be
expected  from a widespread  trade liberalization,  these transition costs should not be underestimated.
Between 1975-81,  while the economy  was adjusting  to the new system of incentives,  open
unemployment  more than doubled  to about 13 percent, more than doubling  again during the 1982-83
crisis (it was still 14 percent in 1987)  before returning to about 6 percent with the recovery of the late
1980s  (Meller 1991, table 9).  While the transitional  high unemployment  was largely due to the
concurrent stabilization  and privatization  policies, it is likely that the removal of protection  was
accompanied  by a transitory loss in jobs.
Mexico (table 5).  With a population  of 86.2 million (1990), Mexico is the largest country in
the sample.  The relatively large internal  market helped sustain a high growth through ISI (6.4
percent average GDP growth between 1950  and 1974), and moderate inflation. Protection  was given
through domestic regulations  to key industries,  most of which were public enterprises. Between 1977
and 1982 oil price rises sustained  the economy,  and by the time of the crisis in the early 1980s,
import licensing and QRs combined  with reference  prices and ad-valorem  tariffs to give very high
protection.
16 Part of the high unemployment  during the late seventies  was due to full wage indexation  on
past inflation,  so that real wages were rising when inflation  was falling.  On the other hand, the
boom-bust  cycle during 1979-81  would have been much less (and hence employment  changes  would
have been dampened)  had capital inflows been controlled  and the exchange  rate not been fixed. For
further discussion,  see Corbo, de Melo and Tybout (1986) and Condon, Corbo and de Melo (1990).
This estimate  of the unemployment  due to trade liberalization  is from Edwards and Edwards (1987, p.
122). It is worth noting that the removal of manufacturing  protection led to strong  job creation in
agriculture and to a migration  from urban towards rural areas.  An alternative  estimate  by de la
Cuadra and Hachette  (1991) finds a small net employment  creation from the trade reforms.  However,
their simulation  methodology  ignores the role of relative price shifts, assumes  no effects of trade
liberalization  on nontradables,  and does not account for the unusually strong effect of capital flows on
expenditures  during 1979-81. Their estimates  are therefore, difficult  to interpret.m  - =  * =
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When  the price  of oil tumbled  in 1982  and foreign  interest  rate increases  raised  the external
debt  service  payments,  foreign  banks  refused  to roll over short  term  debt. A crisis  ensued,  as Mexico
suspended  interest  payments  on its external  debt. The primary  fiscal  deficit  reached  7 percent  of
GDP,  and by 1985,  the inflation  rate was 57 percent.
Starting  in 1985,  Mexico  carried  out wide  ranging  reforms  while  simultaneously  starting  to
stabilize.' 7 It joined  the GATT  in 1986,  thereby  binding  its tariff structure  and reduced  its
maximum  tariff from 100  percent  in 1985  to 20 percent  in 1988. At the same  time, import  licensing
was  dismantled  and the import  licensing  coverage  ratio  fell from 92 percent  to 20 percent  of non-oil
tradable  production.  Also, in accordance  with  the Customs  valuation  code  of the GAIT, the use of
reference  prices  for valuation  purposes  (which  had covered  up to 25 percent  of tradable  production  in
1985)  was discontinued  after 1988. Export  subsidies  were also  dismantled  in 1985,  and import  and
duty  drawback  regimes  for exporters  were  started  in 1985. Some  export  controls  remain  for
agriculture  and agro-industry  exports. 18
With  the collapse  of the oil market  in 1986,  Mexico  experienced  a second  sizable  shock  and
inflation  jumped  to 159  percent  in 1987. The economy  has recuperated  strongly  since  then  (see figure
3).  The Economic  Solidarity  Pact  among  the government,  labor  and  private  business  accelerated
strucural  reform  and resulted  in an elimination  of the fiscal  deficit  by 1989. Since  1989,  inflation  is
below  30 percent  and  falling. Since  the initiation  of the reforms,  non-oil  exports  have  doubled  their
share  in merchandise  trade. The reforms  have  also  been  successful  in restoring  growth  (GDP  growth
of 3.1 percent  in 1989  and  3.4 percent  in 1990).
17  A major  component  of the stabilization  program  was the sale  of over 400 SOEs. Subsidies  to
SOEs  were cut down  in half (to 1.5 percent  of GDP)  during  1984-88,  and the proceeds  from
privaization  amounted  to 3.S percentage  points  of 1990  GDP.
11  The progressive  approach  to trade liberalization  in Mexico  in which  sizable  import  (and
export)  controls  remain,  bears  resemblance  to the Hungarian  trade liberalization.30
Mexico also benefitted  from the "announcement  effect" in 1990  of impending  negotiations  to
form a free trade area (FTA) with the US.  The developments  are interesting  for the recent
negotiations  between the EC with Czechoslovakia,  Hungary and Poland that resulted in the Europe
Agreements  of 1992.19  The negotiations  have largely been led by the Mexican desire to achieve  an
improved  and more secure access  to the US market.  Clearly another major reason was to use the
trade agreement  to cement domestic  policy reform and to attract foreign direct investment  (FDI).  As
a result of Mexico's own trade liberalization  measures  and the prospects of an FTA, trade with the
US more than doubled  between 1985 and 1990. And FDI flows from the US into Mexico  in 1992
were double the 1990  levels.
Like Argentina's, Mexico's success with the simultaneous  pursuit of stabilization  and
liberalization  shows that the two can be combined  rather than carried out in the more traditional
sequence  of stabilization  followed  by trade liberalization  and domestic reforms, which was the path
followed  by several of the successful  East Asian countries. In spite of sizable adverse external
shocks, Mexico  has also taken advantage  of the opportunity  to enter into an FTA with the US.  The
prospects  of an FTA have also helped lower inflationary  expectations,  but there is some concern  that
the use of the exchange  rate to lower inflation  might lead to a real exchange  rate overvaluation  and a
loss of competitiveness  for Mexican  non-oil exports.
Uruguay  (table 6).  Starting  in 1955, this country - once dubbed the Switzerland  of Latin
America because  of its high standard  of living and progressive social policies - embarked on a period
of twenty years of stagnation  that culminated  in an economic  and political crisis that brought military
rule in 1974. In many ways, the sclerosis in Uruguay resembled that of some East European
19 Essentially  the agreements  stipulate  that Czechoslovakia,  Hungary and Poland must open their
markets within ten years to EC goods while in return EC will open immediately  its markets for "non-
sensitive"  goods but taking four to six years to remove tariffs and QRs for "sensitive"  goods.
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary and Poland will also have to adopt  EC competition  policy even though their
goods will still be subject to EC's anti-dumping  policy, at least for some time to come.31
Table 6  Reforms In Uruguay
Period  PROTECIION  REFORMS  CRISIS  MILD REFORMS
1955-1974  1974-1981  1981- 1984  1984  - 1990
Overall  pdicy  ISI  Military  takeover in 1974.  Return of democry  in 1985.
environment  Development  of a large  Wide-ranging  reforms  Fuiancial  liberalization
welfare state.  (financial  libealization;  preserved.  Strong  power of
fiscal reform: price  labor unions  restored.
decontrel)




External  factors  Closing of EC market  for  Collapse  of Argentina  (1981)  and crisis in Brazil.
beef exports
Trade policy
Imports  Capital goods imports  Removal  of prior deposit  Maximum  tariff rate reduced  to 45 percent from  Increase in minimum  duty on
subject to prior approval;  requirement,  import  75 percent in 1982  imported  raw materials;  few
widespread  tariffs and QRs;  licensing  and QRs;  Referenc prices (anti-dumping  measure).  QRs remain (on agricultund
progressive  reduction  and  Minimum  export  prices 1983  goods);  unweighted  mean  tariff
unification  of tariffs;  rate is 15% in 1992;  3 tier
tariff (10%, 17%, 24%).
Exports  Taxes on traditional  Removal  of export taxes;
exports.  tax rebate and interest
subsidies  for nontraditional
exports until 1978
Exchange rate  Dual foreign exchange  'Tablita' or preannounced  Crawling  peg to maintain  a competitive  real  Reform  of reference  prices and
market;  periodic  change in exchange  rate  exchange  rate  minimum  export price system
devaluations  (1978-82)
Main results  Stagnation  Increase  in export share of  GDP decline  of 14.7 percent in 1982-83. Capital  Sluggish  growth; resturn  of the
Large fiscal deficit  and high  GDP; GDP growth 4.1  flight  and debt crisis.  welfare state.  High inflation.
inflation  percent; appreciation  of
by 1974.  real exchange  rate, and
Rising social conflicts.  collapse in 1982.32
countries. Very inefficient industrles  protected  by a complex structure of administrative  protection,
tariffs and an array of QRs that closed  the country  to imports so that low quality domestic products
were all that was available. Powerful labor unions had essentially  stifled private investment  and
during the period 1955-74,  average yearly GDP growth was 1 percent.
The initial conditions  at the time the reforms were initiated in 1974 were similar to those in
Argentina  and Chile:  a large flscal deflcit and high inflation. The trade liberalization  included  a
removal of prior deposit requirements,  import licensing  and a progressive reduction in tariffs. These
measures were accompanied  by the removal of export taxes and strong export incentives  for non-
traditional  exports (in the form of tax rebates and interest rate subsidies  that reached 15 percent of
export value). At the same time, the peso was made fully convertible, and a fiscal reform simplifled
the tax system.  While the adoption  of an exchange-rate-based  stabilization  program in 1978  was
poorly conceived  (see box 2), and Uruguay could not isolate itself from the instability  in Argentina
and Brazil, the reforms led to a marked relative improvement  in performance  and to a noticeable
increase in the export share in GDP (see figure 3).  But in the end, after one takes into account the
crisis years of the early eighties, the improvement  was mild and average yearly GDP growth during
1974-89  was only 1.1 percent which is about equal to the historical average.
Uruguay is a small economy. With only 3 million  people, it needs to export  to overcome a
small internal market.  In spite of a succession  of tariff reductions  resulting in a maximum  tariff level
of 4S  percent for final goods (down from 75 percent in 1982), barriers to foreign  products remain
high because  of the extensive  use of reference  prices for the application of tariffs.  Very often the
base for the reference prices is high, and calculations  for some 500 products in 1989  show that the
tariff reductions  since 1986 had been more than compensated  for by the protection  granted through
the use of reference  prices with the application  of reference  prices boosting protection on average by33
18  percentage  points. High  rates  of protection  through  administered  protection  thus continued  to act
as a tax on exports.
Uruguay  is also potentially  interesting  for FStJ countries  because  of the extensive  lobbying
and  rent-seeking  that  has taken  place  to try to appropriate  the rents created  by the complex  system  of
protection.  Rama  (1991)  reports  on the number  of lobbying  activities  carried  out in Uruguay  during
1925-83.  He counted  the specific  protective  measures  that were  carried  out to protect  particular
interests  (e.g. a higher  tariff  for a particular  good)  rather  than  general  protective  measures  (e.g. a
change  in the maximum  tariff  level). Resolutions  with a specific  promoter  amounted  to 1849
measures  over the 1925-83  period.'  Adding  the measures  that  concerned  a small  number  of
products  to his list resulted  in a total  of 3973  measures  over  the period.
In ftrther analysis  of the data, Rama  finds  a significant  positive  correlation  between  the
intensity  of rent-seeking  and  sectoral  output  growth  with  a three  year  lag, suggesting  that  the rents can
only be appropriated  after  investing  in the favored  sector. Furthermore,  the positive  correlation
disappears  after  the fifth  year  and eventually  becomes  significantly  negative  with  the stagnation  of the
1960s  reflecting  the rent-seeking  peak  of the 1940s. Interestingly,  rent-seeking  activities  did not
diminish  with the  reforms  in the 1970s. Lobbying  shifted  towards  exporting  activities  as incentives
were  being  provided  to non-traditional  exports.
In spite  of notable  reforms  starting  in the middle  of the 1970s,  in comparison  with  the other
countries  considered  here, Uruguay  has continued  to be governed  by extensive  regulations  including
complicated  rules  for wage  bargaining  with labor  unions. Reforms  have  had some  effect  in reversing
the stagnation  that  had set in since  the mid-fifties,  but  not enough  has been  done  to turn the economy
X He finds  for instance  that 71 foreign-trade  regulations  werd  approved  for the benefit  of a single
textile  firm, and  39 in favor  of one firm in the rubber  sector.34
around from the ISI strategy. The lesson is that as long as extensive  regulations  prevail, lobbying  and
rent-seeking  activity will be widespread,  and resource use will be inefficient.
4.  Regionaltsm and Trade LUberalizatione
In the 1960s, Latin America engaged  in a series of regional arrangements  aimed at promoting
growth and industrialization  through the reduction of barriers to intra-Latin  American trade.  The
agreements  ranged from FTAs (e.g. Andean  Pact and LAFTA)  to commnon  markets (CACM).  It is
generally agreed that this regional approach to trade liberalization  was a failure.  First, reductions  in
trade barriers were not across-the-board  (as in the European cases of EC and EFTA) but on a
product-by-product  basis.  This approach  resulted in many exceptions. Second, high rates of
protection were maintained (or erected) against  third countries. Third, there was little scope for
efficiency  gains as the economies  had little to trade with one another.  And, for manufactured  goods,
when trade was created as a result of the preferential tariff reduction, partner countries were generally
very high cost suppliers when compared with non-partners. As a result, the trade among  regional
partners reduced rather than increased  welfare. For FSU countries during the transition, it can be
argued that some sort of preferential trading arrangements  would be warranted to avoid a sudden
(rather than gradual) collapse in trade.  However, the lesson from regional arrangements  in Latin
America during the 1960s is that they lowered, rather than raised, welfare.
After two decades  of no progress, recently there has been a sharp revival in regional
integration. For this new wave of regionalism,  the outlook is more favorable  than for the first wave
of regionalism  in the sixties.  This is so because the countries  have on their own unilaterally  reduced
2  For further discussion,  see Nogues and Quintanilla  (1991) and de Melo, Panagariya and
Rodrik (1992).35
Box 3  The Economics of Regional Integration
Under almost all circumstances,  a unilateral  trade liberalization  in which trade barriers are
lowered  against all trading partners is superior to the discriminatory  approach followed  by regional
arrangements  such as an FTA.  This is because  imports will always be supplied by the lowest cost
supplier  when there is no discrimination  among  trading partners, whereas this may not be the case
under a regional arrangement, as a partner may displace imports from a low-source third country
supplier  and the government  loses tariff revenue since partner imports  enter duty-free.
Regional integration  usually  starts with trade liberalization  and most arrangements  are either
Free Trade Areas (FTAs) or customs unions (CUs).  Common markets are established  when there is
not only a common external  tariff (CET) as in a CU, but also free mobility of labor and capital across
borders.  Full economic  integration  occurs when other policies (e.g. tax policy regulations, and
standards)  are harmonized.
One can show that one can always design a partial trade arrangement  (involving  less than full
tariff elimination)  that improves  welfare for union members while leaving unaffected  the welfare of
third countries. One car. also show that there are benefits from being a large negotiator  (as in the
case of the EC) in multilateral  trade negotiations  as one is likely to strike better terms of trade than a
single member in isolation. Finally one can also show that if the world divides into a few trading
bloc each of which erects high barriers against  countries (with free trade for members in the
bloc), then the regional approach  to trade liberalization  which guarantees market access  to one of the
blocs can be superior to unilateral trade liberalization  if the barriers imposed  by each bloc are
sufficiently  high.
Past regional integration  schemes  have usually  been successful  for developed  countries  but not
for developing  countries. This is because  trading partners in developed  country integration  schemes
were usually low cost producers, whereas this was not the case for developing  countries. For
developing  countries  more success  usually accompanied  the regional integration  arrangements  that
were less ambitious  and encouraged  cooperation  (e.g. common infrastructure,  education, etc.) rather
than trade liberalization.
A number of recent regional trading arrangements  have been between developed  and
developing  countries. These arrangements  have been sought by the developing country  partner not
only to secure market access and cement reform measures (e.g. as in the Mexican case), but also to
acquire the institutions  of the developed  country  partner (more stable macro policies, higher
standards, etc.).36
most of their barriers to trade.  Under these circumstances,  the scope for inefficient  preferential
arrangements  is greatly reduced  as partners are no longer high cost suppliers.  Also, these
arrangements  are viewed as an alternative  to the slow process of multilateral  trade negotiation  in the
GATT and as a way to dilute the resistance to domestic lobbies that would likely oppose more
strongly opening  the doors to imports  from all sources than to regional neighbors.
In addition  to the Economic  Initiative  of the Americas  launched by the U.S. in 1991, which
aims at launching  a hemispheric  FTA following  substantial  trade liberalization  by Latin American
countries, three regional arrangements  have established  ambitious  targets for the next few years.  The
CACM has been revived in 1990  with the aim of establishing  a CET structure  of 5, 10, 15 and 20
percent by early 1993 and to harmonize  all instruments  of trade policy such as rules of origin and
anti-dumping  regulations. The Andean Pact has also been renewed  with two new members, Ecuador
and Peru, Joining Bolivia, Colombia  and Venezuela. A CET structure of 5, 10, and 15 percent is to
be implemented  by 1994 (Bolivia  will maintain  her lower tariff structure and autos and agricultural
products will be exceptions), Finally, Argentina,  Brazil, Paraguay  and Uruguay signed a Treaty in
1991  to establish  MERCOSUR  which is to result in free trade in goods and services and capital  and
labor mobility  by 1994. However, a CET remains to be agreed upon for the MERCOSUR.
It is too early yet to tell whether  the agreed upon reduction in tariffs will be carried out even
though so far the initial announced  tariff reductions  to intra-regional  trade have taken place.
Although  the start seems promising, in the end the success of this regional approach  to trade
liberalization  will depend upon limiting the scope for interim exceptions, as lobbies  are likely to use
the opportunity  to  oppose further liberalization. Likewise, rules of origin in the case of FrAs  should
put low limits to domestic content requirements  and CETs in the case of CUs should also be kept
low, preferably to the tariff levels of the partner with the lowest protection. If such pitfalls are37
avoided, the new wave of regional integration  in Latin America will at least avoid the negative
efficiency  effects that took place following  the preferential  arrangements  of the 1960s.
5.  Conclusions
The experience  of Latin America shows that trade liberalization  can be carried out
successfully  at the same time that stabilization  measures  are implemented  to reduce inflation and the
real exchange rate is realigned  to correct for external  deficits.  Indeed, it can be strongly argued that
a rationalization  of the foreign trade regime is essential  for the success of stabilization  measures  since
an open trading regime imposes  discipline  on the economy's activities  and can be a powerful
complement  to stabilization. The experience  of the five countries  examined  is consistent  with this
view, as all successful  stabilization  episodes  were accompanied  by trade liberalization.
Second, far reaching reforms can be carried out fairly rapidly. This is especially  relevant for
EE and FSU countries  which also have in place economic  structures  that have been heavily protected
from international  competition  for a long time.  Even though the extent of protection  is likely to be
higher in many FSU and EE countries, the Latin American  countries examined  here all had highly
protected  manufacturing  sectors for three to four decades.
lhird,  success requires  a comprehensive  reform package. In the sample of five countries,
Uruguay reformed  the least and has, so far, the fewest signs of sustained  growth.  To get a sustained
supply response, trade liberalization  must be accompanied  by the appropriate  supporting policies, e.g.
the removal of price controls  in domestic  product markets, of constraints  In labor markets through
institutional  rigidities  for labor use, and of constraints  in capital markets  through non-market
allocations  of credit.38
Fourth, prudential  regulation  was overlooked  during the banking  sector reforms of the late
1970s  in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay  and in the extensive  enterprise  privatizations  in Chile. This
resulted in interlocking  ownerships  that resulted not only in wealth concentration  but also in risky
portfolios  in the banking system. And the absence  of fair deposit insurance contributed  to excessively
high deposit rates by commercial  banks experiencing  repayment  difficulties  on the part of borrowers.
Thus financial  sector liberalization  should be accompanied  by appropriate  prudential  regulation  and
fair deposit insurance, and the links between commercial  banks and private sector firms should be
checked.
Fifth, countries  that stabilize  while opening  up should carefully  follow the evolution of the
real exchange  rate (and real interest rate), which is crucial for the long-run success of the reform.
Too often, Latin American economies  reversed liberalization  policies because the real exchange  rate
was allowed to appreciate  while the authorities  were trying to reduce inflation. Indeed, the specter
of real exchange  rate appreciation  is still today a potential threat for the recent reforms in Argentina
and, to a much lesser extent, in Mexico. Long-run success of trade liberalization  requires a
competitive  and stable real exchange  rate.39
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